A state trooper stopped a vehicle on I-295 in Burlington County. The basis for the stop was a damaged tail light. The vehicle, which also changed lanes without signaling, had three occupants – the driver, a front-seat passenger, and a six-year-old child in the back seat. The trooper smelled burnt marijuana upon approaching the passenger side of the vehicle, and then asked the front passenger, the defendant Hagans, to step out of the vehicle. He arrested, handcuffed, and Mirandized him, and called for backup. He then asked the driver, Shonsheray Chandler, to step out of the vehicle. He Mirandized her and asked her about the presence of Marijuana in the car. She denied both knowing the defendant possessed marijuana, and that she had been smoking it in the car. He handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the back seat of the police car.
The trooper asked Chandler to consent to a vehicle search. Prior to reading her the consent form, he stated “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” He read her the form, told her that she could refuse to consent, and that she could leave absent some other reason to hold her. He also told her that she could be present during the search if she consented, and could withdraw consent at any time. At first, Chandler refused to consent to the search. The trooper responded by saying that he was going to apply for a search warrant which would just prolong the inevitable, and that he just wanted to make things easier. Chandler then consented to the search. In fact, the record indicated that she repeatedly consented to the search after her initial denial. The trooper then re-read the consent form in its entirety and again asked Chandler if she consented to the search, and she responded in the affirmative. The trooper also repeated for the mobile video recorder (“MVR”) that Chandler initially denied consent, but then changed her mind. The vehicle search yielded a bag of marijuana and a handgun.
The defendant admitted that the marijuana and gun were his, and was charged accordingly. During a suppression hearing, the trial court found that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate division affirmed. Continue reading ›